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Abstract
With an increasing emphasis on network security, much more attention has
been attracted to the vulnerability of complex networks. The multi-scale
evaluation of vulnerability is widely used since it makes use of combined
powers of the links’ betweenness and has an effective evaluation to vulner-
ability. However, how to determine the coefficient in existing multi-scale
evaluation model to measure the vulnerability of different networks is still an
open issue. In this paper, an improved model based on the fractal dimension
of complex networks is proposed to obtain a more reasonable evaluation of
vulnerability with more physical significance. Not only the structure and
basic physical properties of networks is characterized, but also the covering
ability of networks, which is related to the vulnerability of the network, is
taken into consideration in our proposed method. The numerical examples
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and real applications are used to illustrate the efficiency of our proposed
method.
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1. Introduction
Complex network are widely used to model the structure of many complex
systems in nature and society [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. An open issue is how to assess
the vulnerability of complex networks [8, 9, 10, 11], whose main objective is
to understand, predict, and even control the behavior of a networked system
under vicious attacks or any types of dysfunctions [9, 12].
Different approaches to characterize network vulnerability and robustness
have recently been proposed, which can be grouped into two types broadly
[13, 14]. The first type of approach is related to structural robustness [13,
15, 16]: how topological properties of networks are affected by the removal
of a finite number of vertexes or/and links, such as the degree distribution,
the network connectivity level, the size of largest component, the average
geodesic length and etc. The second type of method concerns dynamical
robustness [6, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The removal of a vertex or link will cause the
flow to redistribution with the risk that some other vertexes or links may
be overloaded, which can cause a sequence of failures and even threaten the
global stability. Such behavior is called cascading failures [13, 21, 22, 23].
One of the mostly used methods is proposed by Boccaletti et.al [9].
They construct a multi-scale evaluation model of vulnerability, which makes
use of combined powers of the links’ betweenness. Due to the simplicity
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and efficiency, this method is heavily studied [13]. One limitation of original
model is that it cannot discriminate two different networks in some situations.
To solve this problem, a coefficient p is introduced to improve the original
model. However, a straight problem is that how to determine the coefficient
p. The method to determine the coefficient p in Boccaletti et.al ’ work is
very complicated and lack of physical significance.
The main motivation of our work is that we believe that this coefficient
should be determined by the network itself. To address this issue, we take the
fractal dimension of complex network into consideration. The dimension of
complex networks is one of the most fundamental quantities to characterize
its structure and basic physical properties [24, 25, 26]. One has proved that
the network dimension is a key concept to understand not only network
topology. But also dynamical process on networks, such as diffusion and
critical phenomenon including percolation, which is also used to characterize
the vulnerability of network. Box covering algorithm [27, 28, 29] are one
of the typical ways to calculate the fractal dimension [30]. In short, fractal
dimension is a key parameter to represent the characters of the network.
Based on this idea, we propose that the dimension of the network has a
significant relation with network vulnerability in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminar-
ies. In Section 3 we calculate the vulnerability of some networks using the
proposed method. In Section 4 we compare the proposed method with the ex-
isting methods in other papers by calculating network vulnerability. Finally,
we summarize our results in Section 5.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce Boccaletti et.al ’s model[9] and three other
methods [6, 8, 13]. In general, the complex networks can be represented
by an undirected and unweighted graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of
vertices and E is the set of edges. Each edges connects exactly one pari of
vertices, and a vertex-pair can be connected by maximally one edge, i.e. loop
is not allowed.
In Boccaletti et.al ’s work [9], the original method to evaluate the vul-
nerability is represented by the average edge betweenness, which is defined
as:
b1(G) =
1
|E|
∑
l∈E
bl, (1)
where |E| is the number of the edges, and bl is the edge betweenness of the
edge l, define as:
bl =
∑
j,k∈V
njk(l)
njk
, (2)
where njk(l) is the number of geodesics(shortest path) from j to k that con-
tain the link l, and njk is the total number of geodesics from j to k.
However, this evaluation of b1(G) gives no relevant new information about
the vulnerability of the network. For example, two networks referred in [9]
shown in Fig. 1 can’t be distinguished using this method. By evaluating
the vulnerability according to Eq. 1, one gets b1(G) = b1(G
′) = 43/13. It’s
absolute that the “bat” graph G is more vulnerable than the “umbrella”
graph G′, but Eq. 1 gives the same evaluation result.
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Figure 1: The “bat” graph G and the “umbrella” graph G′[9].
In order to overcome the original method’s limitation of failing to distin-
guish some networks, the coefficient P was introduced to evaluate vulnerabil-
ity of complex network, which is called multi-scale evaluation of vulnerability
[9] and shown as below:
bp(G) = (
1
|E|
∑
l∈E
bpl )
1
|p| (3)
for each value of p > 0. If we want to compare two networks G and G
′
, first
computes b1. If b1(G) < b1(G
′
), then G is more robust than G
′
. On the
other hand, if b1(G) = b1(G
′
) then one takes p > 1 and computes bp until
bp(G) 6= bp(G
′
).
To get the coefficient p, Boccaletti et.al define a relative function of p
like:
f(p) = (bp(G)− bp(G
′
))/bp(G) (4)
The coefficient p is obtained when the function has a maximal value. For
the more detailed information to determine the coefficient p, refer [9]. It’s
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clear that, the coefficient p’s definition is complicated and lack of physical
significance. The coefficient p should reflect the complex network itself.
For the sake of comparison, three other methods to calculate vulnerability
are described as follows. The first method is the average inverse geodesic
length l−1 [6]:
l−1 = 〈
1
d(v, w)
〉 ≡
1
N(N − 1)
∑∑ 1
d(v, w)
. (5)
where d(v, w) is the length of the geodesic between v and w (v, w ∈ V ). The
larger l−1 is, more robust the network is.
The second method is the largest component size LCS (0 < LCS < 1)
[8], which quantifies the number of nodes in the largest connected subgraph
and defined as follows:
LCS =
Ns
N
(6)
where Ns is the size of the largest connected subgraph.
And the third method is the normalized average edge betweenness bnor(G)
[13], which is on the base of the Eq. 3 while p = 1 and is defined as:
bnor(G) =
b1(G)− b1(Gcomplete)
b1(Gpath)− b1(Gcomplete)
=
b1(G)− 1
N(N+1)
6
− 1
. (7)
where Gcomplete is a complete graph and Gpath is a path graph.
3. Proposed vulnerability model
In this section, the proposed method is detailed. As mentioned in in-
troduction section, We think that the coefficient p should be determined by
the network itself. In addition, this coefficient p should also has the direct
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relation to the vulnerability of this network. In our opinion, the fractal di-
mension of the network is a promising alternative. For a given network G
and box size lB, a box is a set of nodes where all distances lij between any
two nodes i and j in the box are smaller than lB. The minimum number of
boxes required to cover the entire network is denoted by NB. The detailed
illustration referred in [28] of the calculation of the fractal dimension is given
in Fig. 2. The fractal dimension or box dimension dB calculated with the
box covering algorithm is given as follows [27, 28]:
NB ≈ l
−dB
B (8)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the box-covering algorithms. Starting from G (upper left panel),
a dual network G′ (upper right panel) was constructed for a given box size (here lB = 3),
where two nodes are connected if they are at a distance l ≥ lB. A greedy algorithm was
used for vertex colouring in G′, which is then used to determine the box covering in G, as
shown in the plot[28].
It is very known that the fractal dimension can characterize the network
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structure and basic physical properties which reflects the covering ability. For
a given network, the higher the fractal dimension, the higher the covering
ability, which means that there are more edges between the nodes in this
network. We also know that given certain nodes in the network, the more
edges, the more robust of this network. As a result, the fractal dimension
not only reflects the characters of the network structure, but also partially
reflects the vulnerability of the network. According to this idea, we use the
fractal dimension to redefine p. So the proposed method to calculate network
vulnerability is given as follows:
VdB(G) = (
1
|E|
∑
l∈E
bdBl )
1
|dB | (9)
where dB is the fractal dimension of the complex networks.
We apply our method to six networks to calculate the vulnerability in-
dex. Two are synthetic networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi(ER) random networks [31]
and Baraba´si-Albert(BA) model of scale-free networks [32]. Four are real
networks: US airport networks [33], network of e-mail interchanges [34],
protein-protein interaction network [35] and German highway system [36].
The vulnerability of these networks are calculated according to the follow
steps:
(1) calculate the fractal dimension dB of these networks above using box-
covering algorithm [27, 28], i.e. Eq. 8. The results are illustrated in Fig.
3.
(2) Calculate the average edge betweenness according to Eq. 2, and
normalized by N(N−1)
2
.
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Figure 3: The NB versus lB of some complex networks obtained in a log-log scale: (a) the
ER network with the size N = 1500, the average degree < k >= 6. (b) the BA network
with N = 1500, the average degree < k >= 4.8. (c) US airport network. (d) network of
e-mail interchanges. (e) protein-protein interaction network. (f) German highway system.
The vertical ordinate of every subplot is the mean value of NB for 100 times, and the
horizonal ordinate represents the box size lB. The absolute value of the slope is the fractal
dimension. 9
(3) Calculate the vulnerability VdB in accordance with Eq. 9.
Table 1 shows the result. The larger the VdB , the more vulnerable the
network. So the results illustrate the order of vulnerability GH > AP >
PPI > BA > EI > ER, and the robustness of networks correspond to the
inverse order.
Table 1: General characteristics of several complex networks. For each network we list
the number of nodes N , the average degree < k >, the fractal dimension dB, and the
vulnerability VdB obtained by the proposed method. ER, BA, AP, EI, PPI and GH denote
the ER network, the BA network, US airport network, network of e-mail interchanges,
protein-protein interaction network and the German highway system.
network N < k > dB VdB
ER 1500 6 3.711 0.0011
BA 1500 4.8 2.05 0.0014
AP 500 11.9 4.048 0.0079
EI 1134 9.6 4.235 0.0013
PPI 2375 9.8 4.486 0.0037
GH 1168 2.1 1.34 0.0184
4. Comparison and Discussion
In this section, to testify the correctness of the results obtained by the
proposed method, three other methods presented in section 2 are applied
to these networks to calculate the vulnerability, that is, the average inverse
geodesic length l−1, the largest component size LCS and the normalized
average edge betweenness bnor(G). All three methods can reflect static topo-
logical properties of networks, in order to get the vulnerability reflecting the
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dynamical overall characteristics of networks, we apply the RB attack strat-
egy [6] to networks when calculating them. RB attack strategy means that
one should remove the node which has the highest betweenness value and
recalculate the betweenness at every vertices-removing step. In this paper,
l−1, LCS, bnor(G) are computed after 1% of vertices are removed. Table 2
shows the results.
Table 2: The normalized average inverse geodesic length l˜−1, normalized largest compo-
nent size L˜CS and the average edge betweenness bnor(G) is computed after 1% of vertices
are removed. All of them are normalized by the values of the initial networks.
network VdB l˜
−1 L˜CS bnor(G)
ER 0.0011 0.9788 0.9886 0.0666
BA 0.0014 0.8152 0.9613 0.4874
AP 0.0079 0.6259 0.746 -0.3563
EI 0.0013 0.9466 0.9841 0.1490
PPI 0.0037 0.7681 0.9175 0.0912
GH 0.0184 0.5119 0.9144 0.7644
All the methods can give a rank about the vulnerability of these networks.
The l˜−1 gives a order ER > EI > BA > PPI > AP > GH about the
robustness, and a robustness order ER > EI > BA > PPI > GH > AP
judging from L˜CS, whereas bnor(G) ranks GH > BA > EI > PPI > ER >
AP in point of vulnerability. One can see that, The German highway system
has the largest vulnerability and for all the methods. The proposed method
and the l˜−1 shows a completely identical order. So the proposed method is
an effect way to quantify the network vulnerability.
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In a addition, the multi-scale model to calculate vulnerability proposed
by Boccaletti et.al are applied to these networks. A comparison of the
proposed method and Boccaletti et.al ’s are illustrated in Table 3 and Fig.
4. As mentioned in section 2, we should firstly compute b1(G) to judge if
p = 1 can distinguish these networks. Through computing, we found that
b1(BA) = b1(AP ) = 0.001, which mean that the coefficient p should be
recalculated according to the relative function (Eq. 4). When the relative
function has a maximal value, p is obtained. We get p = 12 for BA and AP
networks, bp(BA) = 0.0035, bp(AP ) = 0.0234. Boccaletti et.al ’s method
gives a order PPI > EI > ER > BA > GH > AP about the robustness.
0 10 20 30 40 50
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US airport networks
BA model networks
p=12
relative function
Figure 4: bp for Baraba´si-Albert(BA)model of scale-free networks (dot line) and US airport
networks (dash line) as functions of 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. 10(bp(AP )− bp(BA))/bp(AP )(solid line)
as a relative function of 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ has a unique maximum at p = 12
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It’s absolute that, the coefficient p obtained by Boccaletti et.al ’s method
is lack of physical meaning. Comparing rank orders obtained by these method,
it’s easy to found that the proposed method gives a more reasonable order
and a more effective evaluation.
Table 3: Some hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate the comparison of two methods.
network p(dB) of the VdB b1(G) p of Boccaletti et.al ’s bp(G)
proposed method method
ER 3.711 0.0011 9.3909e−004 1 9.3909e−004
BA 2.05 0.0014 0.001 12 0.0035
AP 4.048 0.0079 0.001 12 0.0234
EI 4.235 0.0013 6.6037e−004 1 6.6037e−004
PPI 4.486 0.0037 4.3581e−004 1 4.3581e−004
GH 1.34 0.0184 0.0156 1 0.0156
5. Conclusions
The coefficient p used in the multi-scale model plays an important role
in the vulnerability evaluation. How to determine the coefficient is still an
open issue. The existing method is complex and lack of physical significance.
To address this issue, an improved vulnerability index is proposed based
on the fractal dimension of complex networks. The fractal dimension is
one of the fundamental properties of complex networks, which can not only
characterize the physical properties of networks, but also reflect the covering
ability of networks. As a result, the new model has more meaning in physical
13
aspect compared with existing methods. The numerical examples and real
applications are used to illustrate the efficiency of our proposed method.
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